I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing progress of human society, the protection of the private information has become increasingly subject to public attention. For example, two countries respectively set up n intelligent stations of their own in the third country. Now they want to create a network among their sites to facilitate mutual cooperation. They also want to establish the shortest route which can not only save money but also shrink the possibility of information leakage. However, the two countries are unwilling to disclose the location of other intelligences apart from the most closet two sites. How to protect their own private information in cooperatively calculating is an urgent problem needs to be resolved.
The above-mentioned problem is a special kind of secure multi-party computation (SMC) problem [1] .
Some special problems need to be solved by using special methods to get high efficiency [2] . A number of specific issues of the SMC has received a great deal of research results [5 ~ 7] [10~12]. We consider the two parties in a secure computing environment for the above-mentioned problem. The calculation of the two sides of the closet pair also belongs to privacy-preserving computational geometry (PPGG) problem.
Atallah M. J [3] first proposed the concept of PPGG and introduced some computational geometry problems such as point-inclusion, intersect-determination of polygons, the closest pair and the convex hull problem. It had given some initial solutions. Du Wenliang [4] designed a protocol to judge whether the point is in a circle or in a ellipse. It also introduced the problem of closet pair but it didn't give a specific agreement. After that, many scholars studied on PPGG and designed many efficient protocols. But the problem of closet pair has been seldom studied. A protocol was proposed in [8] to solve this problem but it needed the help of the third party. But in reality, the entirely credible third party doesn't exit. At present, the research data is scarce, so this paper mainly studied this problem and proposed a protocol to solve it.
In this paper, we assume the two parties are semi-honest. They will strictly enforce the agreement.
They will not exist when the protocol is implementing or insert malicious information. But they may collect the information whatever they can get and infer the other side's information. Definition2. Privacy-Preserving Closest Pair [8] Alice has n points in a certain plane, A=(a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n ) ,
Bob has m points in this certain plane,
..,m. They want to get the closet pair among their points. But they don't want to leak their own input.
In this paper, we only consider the points on x axes.
So the problem of secure two-party ranking can be described as follows: Alice has n points (a 1 ,a 2 ,…, a n ), Secure two-party ranking problem can be described as follows: Alice has n data (a 1 , a 2 ,…, a n ), a 1 <a 2 <…<a n . Output: Alice gets(r a1 ,r a2 ,…,r an ) and Bob gets (r b1 ,r b2 ,…,r bm )
Step 1: Step 1. Protocol STPR will leak the number of Bob's data and the range of Bob's data. In Step 2, Bob adds his own numbers with random numbers so it will not leak the concrete data. In Step 3, we mainly invoke DCP. This protocol is secure. At the same time Bob has added his own numbers with random numbers so in Step 3 it will not leak information. So PPCPPP is secure.
(complexity) In Step 1, STRP is invoked one time.
The round complexity of protocol STRP is 3mn+1. In
Step 3, protocol DCP is invoked min{m,n} times at most.
The number of communication is min{m,n} at most. So Step 1: Alice does d1.0*10 10 , P a 0, P b 0. STRP (a 1 , a 2 ,…,a n ; b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b m ); Bob does V=0.
Step in
Step 3, the round complexity is 3min{m,n} at most. In
Step 4, the number of communication is 1. So the round complexity of PPCPP is 3mn+3min{m,n}+2 at most.
This protocol invokes protocol STRP in Step 1. STRP needs 8mn encryptions and 4mn decryptions. In Step 3, protocol DCP is invoked min{m,n} times at most. So
Step 3 needs 8min{m,n} encryptions and 4min{m,n} decryptions. So PPCPP needs 8mn+8min{m,n} encryptions and 4mn+4min{m,n} decryptions.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
In this paper, we mainly discussed the problem of
